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Abstract:
Currently, XACML has becoming the standard for implementing access control policies and consequently more attention is dedi-
cated to testing the correctness of XACML policies. In particular, coverage measures can be adopted for assessing test strategy
effectiveness in exercising the policy elements. This paper introduces a set of XACML coverage criteria and describes the access
control infrastructure, based on a monitor engine, enabling the coverage criterion selection and the on-line tracing of the testing
activity. Examples of infrastructure usage and of assessment of different test strategies are provided.
1 Introduction
Security is a challenging issue in modern networked systems where
adequate security mechanisms are put in place to preserve privacy
and confidentiality of personal and critical data. Among security
mechanisms, one important component is the access control system,
which mediates all requests of access to protected data. Currently,
among the various proposals, the OASIS eXtensible Access Con-
trol Markup Language (XACML) [20] is the most commonly used
standard. However, the verbosity and complexity of XACML syntax
as well as the natural language semantics provided by the stan-
dard, make the specification and management of real access control
policies in practice difficult and error-prone.
For preventing security flaws and violations, specific attention is
devoted to the policy-based testing, i.e. the process to ensure the
correctness of policy specifications and implementations. Indeed,
by observing the execution of a policy implementation with a test
input (i.e., an access request), the testers may identify faults in
policy specifications or implementations, and validate whether the
corresponding output (i.e., an access decision) is as intended.
Considering the strict constraints on testing budget, it is extremely
important to focus the testing activity on the generation or selection
of the test cases that cover the most important features and/or policy
constructs. The purpose is to reduce as much as possible the num-
ber of tests to be executed trying, from one side, to maximize the
fault detection effectiveness, and from the other, to cover the most
important elements/aspects defined into the policy itself.
In this paper, we focus on the testing of the access control poli-
cies and in particular on the coverage assessment of the derived
test suites. In software testing, the coverage of specified entities is
considered a valuable complement to the simple validation of the
software behavior [1]. Indeed, the coverage information can provide
an indication of the efficiency of the executed test cases and can help
to maintain an effective test suite.
In this paper, from one side, we define a set of coverage crite-
ria that can help in the evaluation and assessment of the adopted
testing strategy. On the other, we propose an access control policy
infrastructure, based on an external monitoring facility, for enabling
the language independent coverage measurement and automating the
testing process itself.
A preliminary attempt to realize a coverage assessment frame-
work through monitoring was presented in [8]. Here we extend the
result of [8] by defining four new coverage criteria for XACML
policies and showing their application for the assessment of dif-
ferent testing strategies. We present also the usage of the proposed
infrastructure to realistic case studies.
The type of data to be collected during the testing activity is inde-
pendently specified by the execution engine and is not linked to the
specific notation used for the policy specification.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized into: i) the
definition of four original inclusive coverage criteria; ii) the inte-
gration of a monitoring framework into an access control system
architecture; iii) the definition of the architecture of the Policy
Assessment Infrastructure enabling the coverage criterion selection,
the policy analysis, the monitoring of the policy execution, and the
policy coverage assessment; iv) an instantiation of the proposed
architecture on the XACML access control language.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 and
3 introduce the basic concepts of access control systems and cover-
age criteria respectively; Section 4 presents the architecture of the
Policy Assessment Infrastructure; Section 5 presents experimental
results on real XACML policies; finally, Section 6 presents related
work whereas Section 7 concludes the paper also hinting at future
work.
2 Basic Concepts
Access control is one of the most adopted security mechanisms for
the protection of resources and data against unauthorized, malicious
or improper usage or modification. It is based on the implementation
of access control policies expressed by a specific standard such for
instance the widely adopted XACML [20].
In this paper, we focus on the testing of the access control policies
and in particular on the coverage assessment of the derived test suite.
Here below some basic concepts about the XACML-based access
control system and the coverage testing.
XACML [20] is a platform-independent XML-based language for
the specification of access control policies. Briefly, an XACML pol-
icy has a tree structure whose main elements are: PolicySet, Policy,
Rule, Target and Condition. The PolicySet includes one or more poli-
cies. A Policy contains a Target and one or more rules. The Target
specifies a set of constraints on attributes of a given request. The Rule
specifies a Target and a Condition containing one or more boolean
functions. If the Condition evaluates to true, then the Rule’s Effect
(a value of Permit or Deny) is returned, otherwise a NotApplica-
ble decision is formulated. The PolicyCombiningAlgorithm and the
RuleCombiningAlgorithm define how to combine the results from
multiple policies and rules respectively in order to derive a single
access result. An example of XACML policy is provided in Figure
3. For more details see Section 5.2. The main components of an
XACML based access control system are shown in Figure 1: the
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Policy Administration Point (PAP) is the system entity in charge
of managing the policies; the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) con-
structs an XACML request and sends it to the Policy Decision Point
(PDP); the Policy Information Point (PIP) is in charge of retriev-
ing the attributes of users, resources, and environment and sending
them to the PDP; the PDP evaluates the policy against the request
and returns the response, including the authorization decision to the
PEP. For more details we refer to XACML 2.0 standard [20].
Fig. 1: Access Control System Architecture
Measurement of test quality is one of the key issues in software
testing and coverage measures represent an effective mean for evalu-
ating the different testing approaches [1]. Adequacy criteria evaluate
the testing strategy through the percentage of exercised set of ele-
ments in the program or in the specification. Usually, test coverage
can be used for different purposes: i) improve the test suite so to
exercise elements that have not been tested; ii) test suite augmenta-
tion and test suite minimization in case of regression testing; iii) test
cases selection, prioritization and test suite effectiveness evaluation.
A systematic review of coverage based testing is presented in [22].
3 Coverage Criteria
This section provides a set of XACML coverage criteria useful for
assessing the effectiveness of a generic XACML based testing strat-
egy. Revising and extending the definition provided in [6], we first
provide some generic definitions concerning the policy (Definitions
1 and 2) and request elements (Definition 4) and then we define the
XACML coverage criteria (Definitions 5, 7, 9, 11).
Definition 1 (Target Tuple). Given a Rule R, a Policy P, a PolicySet
PS, with R ∈ P and P ∈ PS, and given the set of XACML Elements,
called XE = {xe : xe is PS or P or R}, the Target Tuple of an xe ∈
XE, called TTxe, is a 4-tuple (S, Res, A, E), where: S (Res, A,
E) is a finite set of subjects (resources, actions, environments) in the
XACML target of xe.
For instance, considering the policy of Figure 3, the Target Tuple
of the policy P is equal to (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅).
Definition 2 (Rule Target Set). Given a Rule R, its Target Set is a set
of Target Tuple, ordered by the XACML hierarchy elements relation,
defined as
TSR =
 TTxe : TTxe =
 TTPS if R ∈ PSTTP if R ∈ PTTR otherwise
 .
For instance, considering the policy of Figure 3, the Rule Target
Set of RuleA is equal to:
{(∅,∅,∅,∅), (∅,{books},∅,∅), (∅,{books},{read},∅)}
whereas the Rule Target Set of RuleB is equal to:
{(∅,∅,∅,∅), (∅,{books},∅,∅), ({Julius},{books},{write},∅)}.
Definition 3 (Rule Effect). Given a Rule R, and given a set RE = {
re : re is Permit or Deny}, the Rule Effect of R, called RER, is the
re ∈ RE, such that re is equal to the Effect of R.
For instance, considering the policy of Figure 3, the Rule Effect
of RuleA is equal to Permit (see line 19).
Definition 4 (Request Target Tuple). Given a request Req, the
Request Target Tuple, called TTreq is a 4 tuple (S_r, Res_r,
A_r, E_r) where S_r, Res_r, A_r, E_r are the sets of subjects,
resources, actions and environments belonging to the request Req.
For instance, considering the request of Figure 4, the Request
Target Tuple is equal to ({Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅).
Using the above definitions in the following the different XACML
rule coverage criteria are introduced as well as the definition of their
effects.
In a nutshell, the XACML rule coverage criteria involve selecting
tests that match or not the Rule Target Sets. The Rule Target Set
is the union of the target of the rule, and all enclosing policy and
policy sets targets. The main idea is that according to the XACML
language in order to match the rule target, requests must first match
the enclosing policy and policy sets targets.
Definition 5 (Rule Target True Criterion). Given a rule R, the Rule
Target Set TSR, and the request Req with Request Target Tuple
TTreq=(S_r, Res_r, A_r, E_r), Req covers the TSR with value
true if and only if for each Target Tuple TTE =(S, Res, A, E) ∈
TSR such that TTE is a TTPS , TTP or TTR
• ∃ an element s ∈ S_r such that s ∈ S or S is ∅, and
• ∃ an element r ∈ Res_r such that r ∈ Res or Res is ∅, and
• ∃ an element a ∈ A_r such that a ∈ A or A is ∅, and
• ∃ an element e ∈ E_r such that e ∈ E or E is ∅.
For instance, considering the policy of Figure 3, the Rule Target
Set of RuleB (see above) and the request of Figure 4, that request
satisfies the Rule Target True Criterion of RuleB. This request does
not satisfies the Rule Target True Criterion of RuleA because the
write action of the request does not belong to the set of actions of
Rule Target Set of RuleA.
Definition 6 (Rule Target True Effect). Given a rule R, the condi-
tion C of R, the Rule Target Set TSR, the Rule Effect RER, and
the request Req with Request Target Tuple TTreq , such that Req
satisfies the Rule Target True criterion, the Rule Target True Effect
is
• RER if C is evaluated to True against TTreq
• ∅ otherwise
If the rule has no condition or the condition can be evaluated to
true, the Rule Target True Effect is equal to the effect of the rule.
Definition 7 (Rule Condition True Criterion). Given a rule R, the
condition C of R, the Rule Target Set TSR, and the request Req
with Request Target Tuple TTreq , such that Req satisfies the Rule
Target True criterion, the request Req covers the C with value true
if and only if C is evaluated to True against TTreq .
Definition 8 (Rule Condition True Effect). Given a rule R, the con-
dition C of R, the Rule Target Set TSR, the Rule Effect RER, and
the requestReq with Request Target Tuple TTreq the Rule Condition
True Effect is RER if and only if:
• Req satisfies the Rule Target True criterion and,
• C is evaluated to True against TTreq
Referring to policy of Figure 3, and the RuleC, the request
of Listings 5 having Request Target Tuple equal to ({Julius ∧
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Fig. 2: Policy Assessment Infrastructure
professor}, {books}, {write}, ∅) covers the Rule Condition True
criterion.
In this case, the Rule Condition True Effect of RuleC is Permit
(line 59).
Definition 9 (Rule Target False Criterion). Given a rule R, the Rule
Target Set TSR, and the request Req with Request Target Tuple
TTreq=(S_r, Res_r, A_r, E_r), the Req covers the TSR with
value false if and only if for each Target Tuple TTE =(S, Res, A,
E) ∈ TSR such that TTE is a TTPS or TTP
• ∃ an element s ∈ S_r such that s ∈ S or S is ∅, and
• ∃ an element r ∈ Res_r such that r ∈ Res or Res is ∅, and
• ∃ an element a ∈ A_r such that a ∈ A or A is ∅, and
• ∃ an element e ∈ E_r such that e ∈ E or E is ∅.
and for TTE equal to TTR,
• @ an element s ∈ S_r such that s ∈ S, or
• @ an element r ∈ Res_r such that r ∈ Res or
• @ an element a ∈ A_r such that a ∈ A or
• @ an element e ∈ E_r such that e ∈ E.
For instance, considering the policy of Figure 3, the Rule Target
Set of RuleA and the request of Figure 4, that request satisfies the
Rule Target False Criterion of RuleA because the write action of the
request does not belong to the set of actions of Rule Target Set of
RuleA.
Definition 10 (Rule Target False Effect). Given a rule R, the Rule
Target Set TSR, the Rule Effect RER, and the request Req such
that Req satisfies the Rule Target False, the Rule Target False Effect
is always ∅.
Definition 11 (Rule Condition False Criterion). Given a rule R, the
condition C of R, the Rule Target Set TSR, and the request Req
with Request Target Tuple TTreq such that Req satisfies the Rule
Target True criterion, the request Req covers the C with value false
if and only if C is evaluated to false against TTreq .
For instance, considering the policy of Figure 3, and the RuleC,
the request of Figure 4 satisfies the Rule Condition False Criterion of
RuleC because: the request satisfies the Rule Target True criterion for
RuleC but the sets of subjects of the request do not include professor
or administrator values.
Definition 12 (Rule Condition False Effect). Given a rule R, the
condition C of R, the Rule Target Set TSR, the Rule Effect RER,
and the request Req such that Req satisfies the Rule Condition
False, the Rule Target False Effect is always ∅.
4 Coverage Testing Framework
In this section, we present the architecture of Policy Assessment
Infrastructure based on an on-line monitor. The proposal has been
conceived to be independent from the language adopted for the pol-
icy specification and flexible enough to be adapted to the different
testing purposes. In particular, Figure 2 (part A) shows the main
components of the proposed Policy Assessment Infrastructure (top
left component), referring to a generic structure of an access control
system (top right component):
• Test case generator is in charge of test cases generation starting
from the policy specification. In literature, depending on the access
policy language there are several proposals such for instance XCRE-
ATE [3] and Targen [15] focused on XACML-based combinatorial
approaches.
• Test case executor takes in input the test suite derived by the
Test case generator, and sends one by one the test cases to the Pol-
icy executor engine. Moreover, it extracts the required information
by each test case and transforms them into events readable by the
Monitor infrastructure.
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Fig. 3: An XACML Policy
Fig. 4: An XACML request generated by Simple Combinatorial
Fig. 5: An XACML request generated by Multiple Combinatorial
• Trace generator is in charge of deriving the set of policy traces.
Specifically, it takes in input the policy from the Policy Administra-
tion Point and, according to the selected coverage criterion, derives
all the possible policy traces. Each trace is a target tuple able to sat-
isfy the selected criterion plus the associated resulting criterion effect
according to the definitions of Section 3. Usually, the traces extrac-
tion is realized by an optimized unfolding algorithm that exploits the
policy language structure. Intuitively, the main goal is to derive an
acyclic graph, defining a partial order on policy elements. Several
proposals are available such as [6, 17] for XACML policy spec-
ification. Once extracted, the traces are provided to the Monitor
infrastructure.
• Policy evaluation engine is in charge of the execution of the policy
and the derivation of the associated response. It communicates with
the Monitoring infrastructure though a dedicated interface such as a
REST one.
• Monitoring infrastructure is in charge of collecting data of interest
during the run-time policy execution. There can be different solu-
tions for monitoring activity. In this paper, we rely on Glimpse [2]
monitoring infrastructure which has the peculiarity of decoupling
the events specification from their collection and processing. As
detailed in Figure 2 (part B), the main components of Glimpse are: i)
Complex Events Processor (CEP) which analyzes the events and cor-
relates them to infer more complex events; ii) Response Dispatcher
keeps track of the monitoring requests and sends back the final cov-
erage evaluation; iii) Rules Generator generates the rules using the
templates stored into the Rules Template Repository starting from the
derived policy traces to be monitored. A generic rule consists of two
main parts: the events to be matched and the constraints to be ver-
ified, and the events/actions to be notified after the rule evaluation;
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iv) Rules Template Repository stores predetermined rules templates
that will be instantiated by the Rules Generator when needed; v)
Rules Manager instructs the CEP by loading and unloading the set of
rules. We refer to [2] for a more detailed description of the Glimpse
architecture.
In a typical workflow of the proposed framework, the Policy
Administration Point sends the policy both to the Test case generator
and the Policy evaluation engine (step 1 of Figure 2). The Test case
generator derives from the policy specification a set of test cases and
sends them to both the Test case executor and the Trace generator
(step 2 of Figure 2). The Trace generator derives from the policy all
the possible policy traces and sends them to the Monitoring infras-
tructure (step 3 Monitoring infrastructure). The Test case executor
sends the test cases to the Policy evaluation engine, moreover it
extracts from these test cases the events that are forwarded to the
Monitoring infrastructure (step 4 of Figure 2). Finally, the responses
associated to the execution of the test cases are forwarded by the
Policy evaluation engine to the Monitoring infrastructure (step 5 of
Figure 2).
5 Experimental results
In this section, the Policy Assessment Infrastructure, instantiated on
the XACML based access control systems, has been used for evalu-
ating the coverage measures of two different test strategies (Section
5.1). In particular, we first present a two-round application example
so to better describe the infrastructure behavior and features (Section
5.2). Then the coverage evaluation of the test strategies with real
word access control policies is presented (Section 5.3).
5.1 Testing strategies
Several common approaches for generating XACML requests are
based on combinatorial strategies [5]. In this paper, among the tools
available for test cases generation we refer to X-CREATE [3, 5, 7].
In particular, we use two test strategies implemented in this tool that
are Simple Combinatorial and Multiple Combinatorial, for deriving
the test suites used to empirically validate the effectiveness of the
proposed approach. We provide below a brief description of the two
strategies referring to [5] for more details.
5.1.1 Simple Combinatorial: The Simple combinatorial strat-
egy applies a combinatorial approach to the policy values. Specif-
ically, four data sets called SubjectSet, ResourceSet, ActionSet
and EnvironmentSet are defined. These sets are filled with the
values of the attributes of the policy elements <Subjects>,
<Resources>, <Actions> and <Environments>, respec-
tively.
Then, an ordered set of combinations of subject, resource, action
and environment is generated considering first Pairwise, then Three-
wise and finally Fourwise combinations. Thus, the maximum num-
ber of requests derived by this strategy is equal to the cardinality of
the Fourwise set.
The application of Simple Combinatorial strategy to Policy 1
derives a set of 6 XACML requests, each one containing one of the
possible combinations of the subject, resource, action and environ-
ment values taken from the policy. An example of XACML request
generated by the Simple Combinatorial for Policy 1 is shown in
Figure 4. This request specifies that subject Julius wants to write
on books resource.
5.1.2 Multiple Combinatorial: Similarly to Simple Combinato-
rial, the Multiple Combinatorial strategy relies on a combinatorial
approach of the policy values. In particular, starting from the Sub-
jectSet, ResourceSet, ActionSet, EnvironmentSet as defined above,
this strategy derives for each set S, the power set of S, called P(S),
as the set of all possible subsets of S. The cardinality of P(S) = 2n,
where n is the cardinality of S. The test requests are then generated
by combining the subject, resource, action and environment subsets
using Pairwise, Threewise, Fourwise combinatorial approaches. The
Fig. 6: Monitoring Rule
maximum number of requests derived by this strategy is equal to the
cardinality of Fourwise set.
The application of Multiple Combinatorial strategy to Policy 1
derives a set of 64 XACML requests, each one containing one or
more subject, resource, action and environment values taken from
the policy.
An example of XACML request generated by the Multiple Com-
binatorial for Policy 1 is shown in Figure 5. This request specifies
that subject Julius, who is also a professor, wants to write on
the books resource. With respect to the request of Figure 4, this
one includes two subjects (Julius and professor) with different
attribute-id (subject-id and role).
5.2 Two-Round application example
In this section we present a two-round application example useful
for better highlight the infrastructure behavior and features. The pol-
icy adopted in this experiment (called Policy 1 in this paper) is a
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Table 1 Rule Target True/False Criteria of Policy 1
A: Rule Target True Criterion
T1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, {books}, {read}, ∅), Permit}
T2 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), Deny}
T3 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
T4 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), Deny}
B: Rule Target False Criterion
T1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, {books}, { 6= read}, ∅), −}
T21 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Julius}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
T22 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
T23 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
T31 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Julius}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
T32 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
T33 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
Table 2 Rule Condition True/False Criteria of Policy 1
A: Rule Condition True Criterion
T1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, {books}, {read}, ∅), Permit}
T2 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), Deny}
T3 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius ∧ {professor ∨ administrator}}, {books}, {write}, ∅), Permit}
T4 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), Deny}
B: Rule Condition False Criterion
T3 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius ∧ { 6= professor∧ 6= administrator}}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
simplified version of an XACML policy defining the access rights
to a library (Figure 3). It includes a policy set target (line 3) that is
empty; a policy target (lines 8-15) allowing the access only to the
books resource; a first rule (ruleA) (lines 19-36) with a target (lines
20-35) specifying that this rule applies only to the access requests
of a read action of books resource with any environment; a second
rule (ruleB) (lines 40-55), which effect is Deny when the subject
is “Julius”, the action is “write”, the resource and environment are
any resource and any environment respectively; a third rule (ruleC)
(lines 59-81) that allows to subject “Julius” the action “write”, if he
is also “professor” or “administrator”; finally, the default rule (line
85) denies the access in the other cases.
5.2.1 First round testing: In the first phase of the experiment,
we applied the Simple Combinatorial strategy to the policy of Figure
3. Each of the 6 generated XACML requests is transformed into an
event by the Test case executor component and sent to the Monitor
infrastructure.
Starting from the policy, for each coverage criteria defined in
Section 3, the Trace generator derives the set of traces satisfying
it. In Tables 1 and 2, the set of traces derived according to Rule Tar-
get True Criterion, Rule Target False Criterion, Rule Condition True
Criterion and Rule Condition False Criterion are provided. Each
Trace Set is sent to the Monitoring Infrastructure as a event.
At this point the Policy evaluation engine is instantiated with
the XACML Sun’ Policy Decision Point (PDP) [18] which exe-
cutes the XACML requests against the XACML policy and sends
the corresponding XACML responses to the Monitor infrastruc-
ture. The Monitor infrastructure observes the on-line execution of
the XACML policy on the PDP, and, according to the values of
the requests, the responses and the set of traces generated from the
XACML policy, assesses the coverage of the XACML requests on
the traces.
As an example, in Figure 6 there is a rule definition for trace T3
of Table 2A. This rule is specified in Drools language [11] which is
the reference language of the Glimpse monitor infrastructure used
in this implementation. It is derived by the monitor infrastructure
as in the following. First, the monitor infrastructure extracts from
the payload of the event GlimpseBaseEventRequest the field data
that contains the values for the (Subjects, Resources, Actions,
Environments) and then checks if they are included in the sets of
policySet, policy and rules target values of the trace T3 (lines [21-
37]). If this is verified the monitoring infrastructure extracts from the
same trace the Response value and, if it is not empty, the monitor
checks whether it is equal to the corresponding PDP response (line
43). If this is true the trace is considered covered (line 49).
In this first round of the experiment, we executed the XACML
policy of Figure 3 with all the requests generated by the Simple-
Combinatorial strategy and we reached the coverage results pre-
sented in Table 3.
Specifically, each row of the table is associated to a different test
criterion, while in the second column the results of the coverage
obtained for the test cases derived by the Simple-Combinatorial are
reported. As in the table, all the criteria except Rule Condition True
Criterion reached the 100% coverage of the traces set. In particular,
for the Rule Condition True Criterion only T1, T2, T4 were covered.
Specifically, the request of Figure 4 is able to cover T2 trace. Simi-
larly, other requests having read as action, books as resource and any
value for subject are able to cover T1 trace; whereas requests having
any subject, action, and environment are able to cover T4 trace. From
the analysis of the coverage assessment results, it was evident that,
by construction, the test suite derived from Simple-Combinatorial
strategy can only cover traces including only one subject, resource,
action and environment value. The coverage of trace T3 requires
XACML requests having more than one subject values because the
effect of the corresponding XACML rule (Rule C of Figure 3) is
simultaneously dependent on more than one subject constraints.
This first round experiment evidenced two peculiarities: the for-
mer is that the Simple-Combinatorial strategy is not effective enough
to reach 100% coverage of the traces and should be enriched. By the
identification of not covered traces, the Policy Assessment infras-
tructure provides important hints to testers and can guide them in
the generation of ad hoc test cases or selection of more effective test
strategies. The latter concerns the policy specification itself. Specif-
ically, the application of different coverage criteria, in particular the
Rule Condition False Criterion showed that the behavior of the sys-
tem defined in Rule B is the same as that defined in Rule C when its
condition is evaluated to False. In particular, the behavior specified
by Rule B is that Julius cannot write on the books resource. This
is the same expressed by Rule C when its Condition is evaluated to
False. This implies a redundancy of the Policy 1.
Considering the results obtained by the Simple Combinatorial test
strategy, to improve the coverage in case of Rule Condition True cri-
terion, we adopted a different test generation approach. In particular,
we used the proposed framework with the XACML policy of Figure
3 and the requests generated by the Multiple-Combinatorial strategy.
As shown in Table 3, third column, in this case we reached the 100%
coverage results for all the four criteria.
5.2.2 Second round testing: In the second round of the exper-
iment, by the analysis of the coverage results, we fixed the incon-
sistences detected in Policy 1 during the test case execution. The
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Table 3 Coverage Results for Policy 1
Coverage Criterion Simple Combinatorial (6) Multiple Combinatorial (64)
Rule Target True 100% 100%
Rule Target False 100% 100%
Rule Condition True 75% 100%
Rule Condition False 100% 100%
resulting modified policy, named Policy 2 in the paper, is equal to
the policy of Figure 3 except for line 63 in which the subject value is
Marc instead of Julius. Starting from Policy 2, the Trace Generator
derived the sets of traces of Tables 4 and 5, according to Rule Tar-
get True Criterion, Rule Target False Criterion, Rule Condition True
Criterion and Rule Condition False Criterion of Section 3.
As in the first round experiment, we used combinatorial strate-
gies for generating the sets of test cases from Policy 2. Specifically,
we derived 8 and 128 test cases according to Simple Combinato-
rial and Multiple Combinatorial strategies respectively. We used the
proposed framework for executing these test cases against all the
four criterion defined in Section 3. The obtained coverage results are
presented in Table 6 (second and third column).
The coverage results of this second round experiment confirm
those of the first round. As before the Simple Combinatorial strategy
does not reach the 100% coverage whereas Multiple Combinatorial
does it.
Moreover, due to the higher number of subjects in Policy 2, the
number of derived requests is higher than that of Policy 1 both for
Simple Combinatorial and Multiple Combinatorial strategies.
5.3 Experimental results
In this section, we show the application of the Policy Assessment
Infrastructure to three real-world XACML policies. In particular,
we used the policies (named demo-5, demo-11 and demo-26) taken
from the Open Source repository software Fedora (Flexible Extensi-
ble Digital Object Repository Architecture) [12] for controlling the
access to the administered digital contents. Details about the policies
structure are reported in Table 7. In particular, the columns repre-
sent the number of rules, conditions, subjects, resources, actions and
distinct functions within each policy.
The coverage experimental results are reported in Table 8. In
particular, for each of the considered policies the rows reports,
the applied test criterion (first column), the number of relative
traces (second column), the number of the requests generated by
the Simple-Combinatorial and Multiple-Combinatorial test strate-
gies (columns 3 and 5 respectively) and the coverage results obtained
by each test suite (Columns 4 and 6 respectively).
As for the two-round application example, also in this experi-
ment the Multiple-Combinatorial test strategy always outperforms
the Simple-Combinatorial one. This is again due to the possibil-
ity provided by the Multiple-Combinatorial of generating requests
having multiple elements.
This is particulary evident considering the Rule Condition False
Criterion where the Simple-Combinatorial reached the 33,50%, 0%,
14,28% coverage percentage of the traces set for demo5, demo26,
demo11 respectively. Indeed, according to Definition 11, to satisfy
such criterion, it is first necessary to satisfy the Rule Target True cri-
terion and make the condition evaluated to false. For all the policies,
the target of the rule considered contains more than one resource
value, therefore cannot be never satisfied by the test cases generated
by Simple-Combinatorial test strategy.
However, considering the cardinality of the two test suites the
Multiple-Combinatorial is much more greater than the Simple-
Combinatorial one. This number could reach not manageable values,
as for instance for demo5, invalidating the efficacy of the Multiple-
Combinatorial test strategy. In these cases, the analysis of the cover-
age percentage of the different criteria could be used for increasing
the performance of simpler test strategies (as for instance Simple
Combinatorial), by adding just the ad hoc test cases so to reach an
established coverage boundary.
These experiment results confirm the ones reported in the previ-
ous section and highlight better how the analysis of the coverage
percentage of the different criteria could be a practical means for
evaluating and improving the test strategies.
6 Related Work
In software testing, white-box approaches based on the coverage of
specified entities are considered a valuable complement to black-
box ones, as coverage information can provide an indication of the
thoroughness of the executed test cases, and can help to maintain
an effective test suite. Code coverage criteria are also addressed by
most of the techniques of test cases prioritization [13, 14], with the
aim to reorder test cases so that those tests that have a higher priority
are executed before the ones having a lower priority. Many propos-
als for test coverage measurement and analysis have been proposed
depending on the adopted policy specification language[22] .
In literature there are few works facing coverage assessment of
XACML policies. Seminal works are presented in [17] and [6]. In
the former, the authors provide a first coverage criterion for XACML
policies defining three structural coverage metrics targeting XACML
policies, rules and conditions respectively. These coverage metrics
are used for reducing test sets and the effects of test reduction in
terms of fault detection are measured. In the latter, the authors also
address the policy set and do not require the policy execution and
PDP instrumentation. The focus is in reducing the effort for coverage
measurement focusing explicitly on the evaluation of the Rule Target
Set. More recently, in [24] the authors extend the introduced con-
cept by presenting a combinatorial testing approach based on data
flow coverage, while in [23] the test execution information is used
to determine which policy element is faulty. Specifically, the authors
introduced the concept of reachability-based and firing-based fault
localization techniques. In this paper, we extend the criteria pro-
posed in [6] differentiating the concept of Rule Target matching, so
to better analyze the evaluation of policy rules.
Considering the automated test cases generation, solutions have
been proposed for testing either the XACML policy or the PDP
implementation [4, 5, 10]. Among them, the most referred ones are
the Targen tool [16], the proposal of [21] and the already mentioned
X-CREATE tool [3, 5, 7].
Finally, concerning the adoption of monitoring facilities for cov-
erage assessment, the work in [8] represents a preliminary attempt of
an infrastructure for enabling coverage criterion selection and policy
coverage assessment analysis. Several general-purpose monitoring
proposals are currently available, which can be mainly divided into
two groups: those that are embedded in the execution engine such as
[10, 19] and those that can be integrated into the execution frame-
work as an additional component such for instance [9]. Among the
additional monitor facility in this paper we refer to the monitor-
ing framework called Glimpse [2], which is extremely flexible and
adaptable to various scenarios and SOA architecture patterns.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a set of coverage criteria and a policy
assessment infrastructure. This last enables the coverage criterion
selection, the monitoring of the policy execution and the analy-
sis of the policy coverage assessment. The conceived architecture
would like to be independent from any specification language. More-
over, we provided an instantiation inside the XACML-based access
control systems and its evaluation on real XACML policies.
The collected results, even if preliminary, showed from one side
the effectiveness of the proposed infrastructure in evaluating the
coverage of an XACML policy, from the other evidenced some
inconsistencies in the policy specification. The analysis of the cover-
age assessment highlighted weaknesses in the test suite and provided
hints both for the generation of ad-hoc test cases and suitable
modification of the policy specification.
Concerning the computational performance of the policy assess-
ment structure, because the framework requires just to listen the
messages flow and works independently from the access control
system considered, it does not impact on the overall performance
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Table 4 Rule Target True/False Criteria of Policy 2
A: Rule Target True Criterion
T1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, {books}, {read}, ∅), Permit}
T2 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), Deny}
T3 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Marc}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
T4 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), Deny}
B: Rule Target False Criterion
T1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, {books}, { 6= read}, ∅), −}
T21 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Julius}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
T22 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
T23 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
T31 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Marc}, {books}, {6= write}, ∅), −}
T32 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({6= Marc}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
T33 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Marc}, {books}, { 6= write}, ∅), −}
Table 5 Rule Condition True/False Criteria of Policy 2
A: Rule Condition True Criterion
T1 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, {books}, {read}, ∅), Permit}
T2 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Julius}, {books}, {write}, ∅), Deny}
T3 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Marc ∧ {professor ∨ administrator} }, {books}, {write}, ∅), Permit}
T4 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), Deny}
B: Rule Condition False Criterion
T3 = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), (∅, {books}, ∅, ∅),({Marc ∧ { 6= professor ∧ 6= administrator}}, {books}, {write}, ∅), −}
Table 6 Coverage Results for Policy 2
Coverage Criterion Simple Combinatorial (8) Multiple Combinatorial (128)
Rule Target True 100% 100%
Rule Target False 100% 100%
Rule Condition True 75% 100%
Rule Condition False 100% 100%
Table 7 XACML Policies Subjects.
Xaml Policy Functionality
# Rule # Cond # Sub # Res # Act # Funct
demo-5 3 2 6 3 2 4
demo-11 3 2 4 3 1 5
demo-26 2 1 1 3 1 4
on this last. Moreover, as described in Section 4, the compositional
nature of the four main components, lets a customizable implementa-
tion of different test strategies and testing criteria. Indeed, tools and
solutions can be easily integrated provided that the specific inter-
action message formats are guaranteed. Considering in detail the
implementation of the policy assessment structure used in this paper,
the Test generator and the Trace generator components have only
off-line activities and do not impact on the online computational per-
formance of the proposed framework. The most critical component
for the on-line testing activity is the Monitor one. In this implemen-
tation we used the Glimpse infrastructure, which in turn relies on
Drools RETE matching algorithms computational performance. We
refer to [11] for more details.
In this paper, the usage and the experimentation of the proposed
access control infrastructure has been limited to the coverage policy
assessment, however it can have an important role also to tracking
the actual resources access and users behavior.
Concerning threats to validity of the presented experiment, the
tools adopted and the algorithms implemented may have influenced
the reported results. It could be that different choices might have
provided different effectiveness results. Another threat to our pro-
posal is due to the employed test strategies. We used Simple and
Multiple Combinatorial test strategies but it is likely that other test
sets may produce different coverage results. Finally, external valid-
ity of the experiment concerns potential issues that may prevent the
generalization of the results, as in all empirical studies including
ours.
We are currently working to include in the access control infras-
tructure more coverage criteria. We plan also to enhance the monitor
infrastructure with facilities for proactively detecting, by the off-line
trace analysis, possible security inconsistencies of the tested access
control policy. Other future work deals with the instantiation of the
proposed infrastructure by considering different access and usage
control policy specification languages. Finally, part of future work
would be also to compare our approach with others XACML based
coverage assessment solutions based on the instrumentation of the
PDP engine.
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Table 8 Experimental Results
Coverage Criterion Traces (]) Requests (]) Coverage (%) Requests (]) Coverage (%)
demo5
Simple Combinatorial Multiple Combinatorial
Rule Target True 4 36 50% 2048 100%
Rule Target False 7 36 71,50% 2048 100%
Rule Condition True 7 36 50% 2048 100%
Rule Condition False 9 36 33,50% 2048 100%
demo11
Simple Combinatorial Multiple Combinatorial
Rule Target True 4 12 50% 256 100%
Rule Target False 6 12 66,67% 256 100%
Rule Condition True 4 12 50% 256 100%
Rule Condition False 7 12 14.28% 256 100%
demo26
Simple Combinatorial Multiple Combinatorial
Rule Target True 3 3 33% 32 100%
Rule Target False 6 3 66,67% 32 100%
Rule Condition True 3 3 33% 32 100%
Rule Condition False 2 3 0% 32 100%
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